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THE CIVIL WAR AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION: THE RELEVANCE OF 
ORIGINAL INTENT 
Herman Belz* 
The Bicentennial, in combination with heightened interest in 
the nature of judicial review, has made original intent a timely and 
controversial subject. The contours of the debate are well known. 
For years supporters of judicial activism have extolled the virtues of 
a "living Constitution" that could be adapted to the changing needs 
of society through judicial interpretation. In actuality, say the de-
fenders of activism, the United States is (and always has been) gov-
erned under an unwritten constitution which permits judges to 
consult concepts of political philosophy, justice, and morality not 
contained in the written Constitution.' Critics contend that courts 
should decide cases on the basis of the text of the Constitution and 
the purposes of the framers. In the last few years the debate has 
heated up considerably, with Attorney General Meese calling for a 
jurisprudence of original intent, and Supreme Court Justice Bren-
nan dismissing professions of fidelity to the intentions of the framers 
as "little more than arrogance cloaked as humility."2 
This debate has been carried on at a high level of abstraction. 
It may be useful, therefore, to adopt a more empirical approach, 
and consider whether the concept of original intent forms an actual 
part of the constitutional order. Has it been historically an essential 
element in American constitutionalism? And if so, how have we 
ascertained original intent? By definition the question of original 
intent is historical in nature. But what kind of history has been 
employed in the search for original intent? Is it the impartial analy-
sis that historians profess as their discipline, or a more pragmatic 
inquiry shaped by political and social goals? 
These questions can perhaps most interestingly and profitably 
• Professor of History, University of Maryland 
I. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revo-
lutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978). 
2. Speech by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., to the Text and Teaching Symposium, 
Georgetown University, Oct. 12, 1985, reprinted in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING 
OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 14 (1986). 
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be asked of the Founding Fathers and the framers of the Civil War 
amendments. Of course the differences between the framers of 1787 
and those of the 1860s are apparent. Although politically moti-
vated, the Founding Fathers acted under conditions of secrecy and 
nonpartisanship, whereas the framers of the Civil War amendments 
were intensely partisan members of Congress acting in full public 
view. Nevertheless, more than at any other time in our history, the 
end of the Civil War was an opportunity for constitutional states-
manship. From the outset, the founders' decisions in giving the na-
tion its fundamental law were considered important enough to give 
rise to controversy over their purposes and intent. Has the same 
been true of the drafters of the Civil War amendments? Has origi-
nal intent been a contested and conspicuous issue in application and 
interpretation of the amendments? 
I 
Justice Brennan has said that although the original intent argu-
ment pretends to depoliticize constitutional decisionmaking, it actu-
ally does the opposite. Justice Brennan contends that originalism 
"expresses antipathy to claims of the minority rights against the 
majority." Upholding constitutional claims only if they are within 
the specific contemplation of the framers, he reasons, in effect estab-
lishes a presumption of resolving ambiguities against the asserted 
claims. "Those who would restrict claims of right to the values of 
1789 specifically articulated in the Constitution," Justice Brennan 
concludes, "tum a blind eye to social progress and eschew adapta-
tion of overarching principles to changes of social circumstance."3 
Justice Brennan may be summarizing the outlook of contemporary 
judicial liberalism. As a historical commentary on the politics of 
originalism, however, Justice Brennan's assessment is misleading; 
those seeking to vindicate constitutional claims have been among 
the most vigorous proponents of adhering to the original intent of 
the Civil War amendments.4 
3. /d. at 15. 
4. A brief summary of the historical situation that produced the Civil War amend-
ments will provide a framework for analyzing the significance of original intent thinking in 
their subsequent application and interpretation. The thirteenth amendment proposed in Jan-
uary and ratified in December 1865, confirmed and extended the Emancipation Proclamation 
by prohibiting the existence of slavery in the United States. In 1866, after restored southern 
state governments enacted legislation known as the black codes regulating the status and 
rights of the former slaves, Congress took steps to define and secure the civil liberty resulting 
from the abolition of slavery. It passed the Civil Rights Act and the Freedmen's Bureau Act, 
protecting United States citizens including blacks, in the exercise of ordinary civil rights such 
as making contracts, buying and selling property, bringing legal action, and testifying in 
court. Concurrently, the Thirty-ninth Congress recommended the fourteenth amendment, 
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Perhaps it will not be surprising to students of history that the 
intention of the framers has always been a major issue in the inter-
pretation of the Civil War amendments. In the 1873 Slaughter-
House Cases, the Supreme Court invoked original intent as a princi-
pal reason for rejecting the claim by white butchers that a Louisiana 
law granting a monopoly in the slaughtering trade violated the four-
teenth amendment. Reviewing the abolition of slavery and meas-
ures adopted in its aftermath, Justice Miller's majority opinion said: 
"The most cursory glance at these articles [i.e., the Civil War 
amendments] discloses a unity of purpose, when taken in connec-
tion with the history of the times, which cannot fail to have an im-
portant bearing on any question of doubt concerning their true 
meaning." The "one pervading purpose found in them all," Miller 
observed, was "the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm 
establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-
made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had 
formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him. "5 
The Court's statement of the "Negro-freedom" theory of origi-
nal intent has usually been viewed as an insincere mask for the real 
purpose of abandoning the former slaves. This is an overly harsh 
judgment. It fails to consider the legitimate interpretive possibilities 
available in the language of the amendments, and overlooks the rec-
ognition of federal authority to protect civil rights actually con-
tained in the Slaughter-House Cases and other decisions in the 
1870s.6 A similar evaluation applies to the Civil Rights Cases of 
1883. Although declaring the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitu-
tional, the Court affirmed the Negro-freedom theory. It recognized 
the power of Congress, under the thirteenth amendment, to remove 
the "badges and incidents" of slavery through legislation prohibit-
ing racially motivated private discrimination. 7 
In Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) the Court again maintained the 
Negro-freedom thesis. Adhering to lower court precedents, it de-
cided that racially segregated transportation facilities required by 
declaring that no state shall make or enforce any law abridging the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law; nor denying to any person the equal protection of the laws. The fifteenth 
amendment, declaring that the right to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, was ratified in 
1870. To enforce the amendments Congress enacted a series of civil rights statutes between 
1870 and 1875. 
5. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
6. Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 SuP. 
CT. REV. 39-79; Palmer, The Parameters of Constitutional Reconstruction: Slaughter-House. 
Cruikshank. and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 739. 
7. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). 
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state law did not violate the equal protection clause. Odious as the 
decision would become in later years, it was consistent with the 
main goal of contemporary racial moderates and liberals, namely, 
to prevent the exclusion of blacks from public facilities and accom-
modations.s Accordingly the Court's reiteration of the Negro-free-
dom thesis should not be dismissed as mere racism. There was 
truth in the Court's statement that "[t]he object of the [fourteenth] 
amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the 
two races before the law." But there was truth, too, in the further 
assertion that the amendment was not intended to abolish all dis-
tinctions of color, "or to enforce social, as distinguished from polit-
ical, equality . . . . "9 
For two decades after Reconstruction the Supreme Court rec-
ognized the Negro-freedom theory of the origin and intent of the 
Civil War amendments. This is not to say that the Court generally 
decided cases involving Negro rights in accordance with the theory 
as later generations would understand it, or that only blacks could 
invoke the protections of the fourteenth amendment.IO The Negro-
freedom theory may be viewed as a residual and attenuated legacy 
of radical Reconstruction, the practical significance of which was to 
oppose the demand for national judicial protection of economic 
rights. 
In the 1890s, however, the Court embraced laissez-faire consti-
tutionalism, liberty of contract, and substantive due process. The 
Court did not justify its new interpretation on the basis of original 
intent; instead, the Court merely exercised traditional judicial 
power to prevent unreasonable denial of rights including destruc-
tion of property.11 To reform-minded critics, however, substantive 
due process signified judicial usurpation; it was a doctrine provoked 
by fear of democratic control of property interests and unjustified 
by the text of the fourteenth amendment or the intent of its fram-
ers.J2 An alternative explanation posited a new original intent the-
ory. This was the conspiracy theory of the fourteenth amendment, 
advanced most strenuously by the famous progressive historian 
8. Riegel, The Persistent Career of Jim Crow: Lower Federal Courts and the Separate 
but Equal Doctrine, 1865-1896, 28 AM. J. LEGAL HJST. 17 (1984). 
9. 163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
10. McLaughlin, The Court, the Corporation, and Conkling, 46 AM. HJST. REV. 45 
(1940). 
II. See Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894); Chicago, Mil-
waukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1889). 
12. A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR 
AND BENCH, 1887-1895 (1960); Haines, The History of Due Process of Law After the Civil 
War, 3 TEX. L. REV. I (1924), reprinted in I SELECTED EssAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
268-302 (1938). 
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Charles A. Beard. Because this theory figures so prominently in the 
modern historiography of the Civil War amendments, it warrants 
brief comment. 
The conspiracy theory held that the Supreme Court was per-
suaded to adopt an economic-rights interpretation of the fourteenth 
amendment by the argument of former Senator Roscoe Conkling in 
San Mateo County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, a railroad tax case. 
Quoting from the journal of the Joint Committee on Reconstruc-
tion, of which he was a member, Conkling implied that the authors 
inserted the word "person" into the due process clause with a view 
toward protecting corporations against state taxation and regula-
tion. Conkling's principal reliance, however, was on the traditional 
legal doctrine, flourishing since the days of John Marshall that a 
corporation was a person. He argued that regardless of the framers' 
conscious intent, the language of the fourteenth amendment re-
quired extending the protection of the equal protection clause to 
corporations.I3 Charles A. Beard, however, in effect defending the 
Supreme Court against the charge of usurpation, treated Conkling's 
argument as evidence of a covert intention on the part of the fram-
ers to bring corporations under its protection.I4 Many works of 
progressive history followed Beard in regarding the conspiracy the-
ory as a true account of the original intent and a decisive factor in 
the Supreme Court's decision to protect corporations and property 
rights.1s 
As progressivism changed into modern liberalism, this inter-
pretation of the fourteenth amendment came under scholarly at-
tack. Hostility toward corporations as well as dissatisfaction with 
the Supreme Court for its opposition to New Deal legislation lay 
behind this changed outlook.I6 To question the conspiracy theory 
was to place the onus for laissez-faire constitutionalism on the 
Supreme Court. It also implied restoration of the Negro-freedom 
13. Boudin, Truth and Fiction About the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 N.Y.U. L. REv. 19 
(1938). 
14. On the general question of the legitimacy of judicial review, Beard defended the 
Supreme Court against the charge of usurpation in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION (1912). At the same time he impugned the motives of the framers of the Constitution 
in AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913). 
His development of the conspiracy theory, in CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN HISTORY (1914) 
and THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION (1927), conforms to this pattern of 
interpretation. 
15. H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION: HISTORICAL EssAYS ON THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT, THE "CONSPIRACY THEORY," AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL-
ISM 31-34 (1968). 
16. /d. at 25. 
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theory of the intent of the fourteenth amendment.l7 Perhaps not 
coincidentally, the Supreme Court contemporaneously decided a 
few cases in favor of Negro civil rights claims. A new phase in the 
interpretation of the Civil War amendments, and in the search for 
original intent, was beginning. 
Between 1938 and 1951 Howard Jay Graham and Jacobus ten 
Broek wrote pioneering studies that revised and greatly expanded 
interpretations of Negro rights. Their work provided the founda-
tion for the modern understanding of the amendments among con-
stitutional scholars in the era of the civil rights movement. 
Graham renewed the search for original intent by demolishing 
the conspiracy theory of the fourteenth amendment. He then 
traced the meaning of the amendment from the Republican framers 
of the 1860s back to the abolitionist movement of the 1830s. Seek-
ing a practical application for his historical thesis and deeply com-
mitted to racial equality, Graham proposed an investigation of 
antislavery constitutional theory as "the key to a better understand-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment." Far from being empty general-
ities, he reasoned, the privileges and immunities, due process, and 
equal protection clauses had a substantive natural-rights content 
that was derived from the Declaration of Independence. Graham 
offered his new theory of original intent, resting it on "an ethical 
interpretation of our national origins and history which most Amer-
icans today proudly accept as a challenge and an ideal," and calling 
it the answer to "[e]ighty years of tortured progress in race rela-
tions" growing out of the failures of Reconstruction. Is Years later, 
Graham candidly acknowledged that his purpose was to aid the 
"bootstrap constitutionalism" that he said his research had cele-
brated.I9 Defending "law-office history" as something that "can 
educate and liberate," he wrote that "History and Criticism are un-
dervalued, indispensable parts of Constitutionalism. Scholarship it-
self is a process-a vital, primary part of due process." Indeed, 
according to Graham, law-office history was indispensable to the 
progress of modern constitutionalism.2° 
Political scientist Jacobus ten Broek was the second great re-
former to exploit an original intent jurisprudence for the Civil War 
amendments, and a theorist of modern equal protection law. ten 
Broek theorized that in the era of pervasive government regulation, 
17. For a reassertion of the Negro rights view of the purpose of the fourteenth amend-
ment, see Conn. General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting). 
18. Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950 
Wis. L. REV. 610, 660. 
19. Cf Levy, Foreword, in H. GRAHAM, supra note 15, at vii-viii. 
20. !d. at 21, 268, 337. 
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"equality supplants liberty as the dominant ideal and constitutional 
demand."2I Encouraged by pro-Negro Supreme Court decisions in 
the 1940s, ten Broek observed that the equal protection clause was 
"now coming into its own." To promote this development, and to 
help the clause attain the "preeminence" and scope intended by its 
framers, he proposed to discover the original intent of the Civil War 
amendments by examining abolitionist constitutional theory.22 
Like Graham, ten Broek found constitutional arguments 
describing a paramount national citizenship, protected by the fed-
eral government against state denial, that comprehended the full 
range of natural rights. This was the intent of the thirteenth and 
fourteenth amendments, which were thus "a culmination of the his-
toric abolitionist movement."23 The momentous result was not 
only the nationalization of civil rights, but also the destruction of 
federalism. "To the extent that abolitionism was consummated in 
the Thirteenth Amendment and reconsummated in the Fourteenth 
Amendment," ten Broek wrote, "a fundamental and revolutionary 
reallocation of the powers of government between the states and the 
nation was sanctified by the organic law of the land."24 ten Broek 
believed that the discovery of this original intent "dissipates much 
of the confusion resulting from the congressional and ratification 
debates" and "settles the answers" to key questions in constitu-
tional law raised by eighty years of interpretation.2s 
ten Broek's pursuit of original intent was a significant change 
in his approach to constitutional adjudication. In the late 1930s, 
ten Broek rejected the idea that the language of the document, the 
debates and proceedings of framing and ratifying conventions, the 
history of the times, and the commentaries of lawmakers, judges, 
and legists could be considered valid evidence of the framers' intent. 
Against the traditional theory, ten Broek and most liberals of the 
day asserted an adaptive theory of constitutional change. If courts 
invoked original intent, said ten Broek, the intent they discovered 
was determined by the conclusion they sought. ten Broek was espe-
cially critical of the idea that the history of the times, or the climate 
of opinion surrounding a constitutional provision, reliably indicated 
the framers' intent.26 This stance becomes rather ironic in light of 
21. Tussman & ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 
380 (1949). 
22. /d. at 341. 
23. J. TEN BROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 123 (rev. ed. 1965). 
24. /d. at 130. 
25. /d. at 27, 29. 
26. ten Broek, Admissibility and Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic 
Aids in Constitutional Construction (pts. 1-5), 26 CALIF. L. REV. 287, 437, 664 (1938), 27 
CALIF. L. REV. 157, 399 (1939). 
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his later writing on the original intent of the Civil War amend-
ments. Clearly ten Broek experienced an intellectual epiphany, for 
his book on the origins of the Civil War amendments, published in 
1951, rested on the assumption that the constitutional text did not 
change its meaning, that history could reveal this meaning, and that 
constitutional construction should be governed by history, even as 
contemporary legal concerns reciprocally guided and informed his-
torical research.27 
II 
When the Supreme Court decided that school segregation was 
unconstitutional in 1954, what might have been a gratifying confir-
mation of Graham's and ten Broek's historical discoveries proved to 
be quite otherwise. In Brown v. Board, the Court chose not to rely 
on the original intent of the fourteenth amendment. Instead, the 
Court cited sociological and psychological evidence attesting to the 
high value placed on education in contemporary American society 
and the harmful effects of racial separation on black children. In a 
new edition of his book on the antislavery origins of the fourteenth 
amendment, ten Broek subsequently observed that it was "little 
short of remarkable that the Chief Justice [in Brown] should have 
cut himself off from these historical origins and purposes, casually 
announcing . . . that 'at best, they are inconclusive.' "2s 
ten Broek, along with other opponents of segregation, had rea-
son to be disappointed, for the Supreme Court before rendering its 
decision had pointedly asked the parties to discuss the original in-
tent of the Civil War amendments. When the Supreme Court found 
itself deadlocked over how to decide the desegregation cases in 
1953, it asked for reargument specifically directed to the question of 
the intent of the framers of the Civil War amendments in relation to 
segregated schools. The Court's request stimulated and gave a kind 
of official sanction to the search for original intent.29 
While the historical research undertaken by the parties encom-
passed broader issues,3o the original intent inquiry posed by the 
27. Cf Abel, Book Review, 4Q CALIF. L. REV., 474 (1952). 
28. J. TEN BROEK, supra note 23, at 25. 
29. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BoARD OF EDUCA-
TION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 613-16 (1975); Kelly, The School 
Desegregation Case, in QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE CONSTITUTION 259-64 (J. Gar-
raty ed. 1964). 
30. The principal historical facts defining the original intent problem as it appeared in 
1953 were as follows: The thirteenth amendment, ratified in December 1865, prohibited slav-
ery and thus by necessary implication guaranteed a condition of civil liberty. It was unclear, 
however, what specific civil rights, if any, the amendment secured beyond a right of personal 
liberty and locomotion. In express terms the amendment did not specify rights, so the ques-
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Supreme Court was more specific. The Court asked these ques-
tions: Did Congress in proposing the fourteenth amendment intend 
to abolish segregation in public schools? If not, did the framers in-
tend that future Congresses might abolish school segregation under 
the fourteenth amendment, or that the judiciary might construe the 
amendment as abolishing such segregation of its own force?JI 
A few facts in the framing of the fourteenth amendment stood 
out as particularly relevant to these questions. First, as originally 
introduced, the Civil Rights bill contained a provision stating: 
"There shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities" 
among the inhabitants of any state on account of race, color, or 
previous slavery. This provision was deleted because, in the opinion 
of several members of Congress, it would prevent the states from 
making any distinction among citizens on the basis of race, includ-
ing the establishment of racially segregated schools.32 As adopted, 
therefore, the Civil Rights Act appeared to be evidence of an inten-
tion not to prohibit segregated schools. On the other hand, the 
broader language of the fourteenth amendment arguably swept be-
yond the confines of the Civil Rights Act. A second key fact was 
that section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, as originally drafted, 
provided that "Congress shall have power to make all laws which 
tion could not be answered simply by reference to the constitutional text. The issue could be 
alternatively phrased by asking what was the meaning or definition of slavery prohibited by 
the thirteenth amendment, which prohibition Congress was authorized to enforce by appro-
priate legislation. Congress in effect answered these questions in 1866 when it passed the 
Freedmen's Bureau Act and the Civil Rights Act. Both measures secured specific rights to 
make and enforce contracts; inherit, lease, or own property; sue, be parties, and give evidence 
in court; and generally to have the full and equal benefit of all laws for the security of person 
and property, the same as was enjoyed by white persons. 
At the most basic level, then, the original intent question was whether the framers of the 
thirteenth amendment intended to give Congress power to secure civil rights in the manner 
contemplated by the legislation of 1866. From the very fact that the Civil Rights Act was 
passed before Congress recommended adoption of the fourteenth amendment, one could con-
clude that even if members of the Thirty-eighth Congress in framing the amendment did not 
intend such an exercise of power, a majority of the Thirty-ninth Congress thought the lan-
guage of the amendment authorized it. The debates in Congress show, however, that many 
lawmakers doubted the constitutional sufficiency of the thirteenth amendment as a basis for 
the Civil Rights Act, and that this doubt was the major reason for including in the proposed 
fourteenth amendment, the main purpose of which was to settle the problem of political 
representation in the former Confederate states, a section defining civil rights and authorizing 
Congress to legislate in support thereof. This fact raises the second major original intent 
question concerning the Civil War amendments: Was section I of the fourteenth amendment 
intended to restate and confirm in appropriate language the Civil Rights Act, or was it in-
tended to provide broader protection and secure additional specific rights beyond those enu-
merated in the statute? 
31. R. KLUGER, supra note 29, at 615-16. There were additional questions concerning 
the power of courts to find school segregation in violation of the fourteenth amendment apart 
from any original intent authority. 
32. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 504-05 (1866). 
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shall be necessary and proper to secure the citizens of each State all 
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all 
persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, 
liberty, and property."33 Several Republicans objected that if 
adopted in this form, the amendment would effect a general transfer 
of sovereignty over civil rights from the states to the federal govern-
ment, while effectively failing to limit the exercise of state power 
that had produced the black codes.34 Accordingly the proposal was 
postponed, and a substitute measure adopted, namely, section 1 as it 
presently stands, prohibiting the states from depriving persons or 
citizens of their civil rights. On its face the change appeared to 
mean that the framers did not intend to give Congress direct ple-
nary power over civil rights, but rather a corrective power to use in 
situations when the states denied or deprived persons and citizens of 
civil rights. 
The Supreme Court's request for reargument produced a con-
siderable body of historical research. And although the Court 
chose not to utilize the historical approach in its opinion, the re-
search it stimulated went a far way toward establishing a new inter-
pretation of the origins and intent of the Civil War amendments. 
Of the scholarly integrity and professional quality of this history, 
however, one may be permitted to have reservations. Alfred H. 
Kelly, a leading historian enlisted by the NAACP, wrote that the 
NAACP brief presented "manipulated history in the best tradition 
of American advocacy, carefully marshaling every possible scrap of 
evidence in favor of the desired interpretation and just as carefully 
doctoring all the evidence to the contrary, either by suppressing it 
when that seemed plausible, or by distorting it when suppression 
was not possible."Js This is not to say that accounts that originated 
in courtroom advocacy, such as those of Professor Kelly himself, 
were partisan tracts bearing none of the marks of scholarly disci-
pline and objectivity. It appears, however, that such writings con-
tinued to reflect the attitude of partisan engagement in which they 
33. /d. at 1034. 
34. H. BELZ, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND FREED· 
MEN's RIGHTS 1861-1866, at 171-74 (1976); Maltz, Reconstruction Without Revolution: Re-
publican Civil Rights Theory in the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 Hous. L. REv. 221 
(1986); Zuckert, Congressional Power Under the Fourteenth Amendment-The Original Un-
derstanding of Section Five, 3 CONST. COMM. 123 (1986). 
35. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 144. Assist-
ing the NAACP were historians Kelly, Howard Jay Graham, C. Vann Woodward, John 
Hope Franklin, all of whom subsequently wrote highly regarded and influential works deal-
ing with the Civil War amendments and Reconstruction. Alexander Bickel, as law clerk to 
Justice Frankfurter, studied the original intent question and published his findings as a law 
review article. R. KLUGER, supra note 29, at 623-26. 
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were conceived,36 more so than is usual in historical literature. Of 
course the historical analysis of original intent that was introduced 
in the school segregation cases by the defendant states was also one-
sided, law-office history. Very little of this material was subse-
quently published, however, and it had no apparent impact on his-
torical writing on the Civil War amendments and Reconstruction.37 
The historical argument that failed to persuade the Supreme 
Court, but nevertheless helped shape the dominant view of the Civil 
War amendments in the 1950s and 1960s, went beyond the Gra-
ham-ten Broek focus on the writings of abolitionists in the antebel-
lum period. Given the questions posed by the Supreme Court, it was 
necessary to pay close attention to the political context and specific 
arguments advanced by Republican lawmakers in 1865-66. The 
problem for liberal historians in particular was to explain how and 
why the egalitarian purposes of the framers, those that would pre-
vent segregation from being established or permit its dismantling, 
had not been carried out in the postwar years. 
Building on his earlier work, Howard Jay Graham held that 
the prohibition of racial discrimination broadly conceived was the 
framers' object. The key to understanding the fourteenth amend-
ment, and its unfortunate treatment at the hands of the judiciary 
during Reconstruction, Graham wrote, was the fact that its Repub-
lican authors thought it spelled out what was already in the Consti-
tution. In other words, they considered it to be a declaratory 
amendment which did not change anything. This belief caused con-
fusion, Graham explained, because members of Congress who ad-
hered to it failed to say precisely what effect the amendment would 
have on existing southern laws and institutions. Moreover, the de-
claratory view could be turned against the purposes of the framers 
and used to restrict the scope of federal civil rights protection, as 
happened in the Slaughter-House and Civil Rights Cases.3s 
In the school segregation cases, the accounts of Alfred H. 
Kelly and Alexander M. Bickel, historical consultant to the 
NAACP and law clerk to Justice Frankfurter respectively, focused 
on the relationship between the Civil Rights Act and the fourteenth 
amendment. Both authors concluded that the principal purpose of 
36. At a public lecture in 1966 Professor Kelly stated that he published his views on the 
original intent of the fourteenth amendment in a law review rather than historical journal 
because of their normative character and advocacy content. 
37. The Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government published some of the ar-
guments. D. Mays, A Question of Intent: The States, Their schools and the Fourteenth 
Amendment (n.d.). 
38. Graham, The Fourteenth Amendment and School Segregation, 3 BuFFALO L. REV. 
I (1953); Graham, Our 'Declaratory' Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1954). 
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the amendment was to constitutionalize the civil rights law. Yet 
each found a more capacious original intent in the general and am-
biguous language of section 1 of the amendment. They agreed that 
political realities, especially the persistence of racism in public opin-
ion, precluded open avowal of radical egalitarian purposes among 
Republican supporters of the War amendments. But this egalita-
rian intent was comprehended in the open-ended language of sec-
tion 1 of the amendment, which would be available as a kind of 
blank check for future generations to draw on as their equal-rights 
vision expanded.39 While liberals thus conceded that the framers 
did not profess to do away with all racial classification, their view of 
original intent emphasized the vaguely egalitarian purpose and re-
formist spirit that might serve as the basis of civil rights policy in a 
more enlightened time.40 
It has been suggested that the Supreme Court eschewed a his-
torically-based decision in the school segregation cases because the 
starkly opposed arguments about original intent revealed the fallacy 
of law-office history.41 Perhaps more simply, the weight of the his-
torical evidence, showing the framers' limited purpose of confirming 
the Civil Rights Act while permitting segregated schools, was on 
the wrong side. In any event, the Brown opinion, based as it was on 
cultural and sociological facts more than on legal and historical 
considerations, called attention to the propriety of judicial poli-
cymaking rather than to the segregation question. To some observ-
ers the Court's decision not to "tum the clock back to 1868 when 
the [fourteenth] Amendment was adopted," and its unwillingness 
even to declare P/essy v. Ferguson wrongly decided, weakened the 
force of the holding. 42 Explanations of the desegregation decision 
showing its consistency with the basic intent of the Civil War 
amendments might help overcome this defect. Professor Charles L. 
Black, Jr., a consultant on the NAACP brief, made one of the most 
coherent attempts at restating the Court's decision in his acclaimed 
essay, "The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decision." Adopting a 
historical perspective, Black argued that the fourteenth amendment 
was intended to prohibit the states from deliberately subjecting a 
39. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. 
REv. I (1955); Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered: The Segregation Question, 
54 MICH. L. REv. 1049 (1956). 
40. C. Vann Woodward shared this point of view in arguing that legal segregation was 
imposed in the late nineteenth century rather than in the aftermath of emancipation. Segre-
gation was thus not the original intention of the framers and ratifiers of the Civil War amend-
ments. See C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955). 
41. Kelly, supra note 35, at 145. 
42. Cf R. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY: THE CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS AND 
THE SUPREME COURT 144-45 (1977). 
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racial group to disadvantage. School segregation, like Jim Crow 
legislation in general, aimed at and achieved precisely this result, 
Black reasoned, so it was plainly unconstitutional.43 
III 
By the early 1960s wrenching progress had been made in the 
struggle for equal rights. The challenge to public school desegrega-
tion mounted by massive southern resistance had been contained, 
and national support for further action against racial segregation 
and discrimination was growing. To many supporters of the civil 
rights movement, the straightforward and compelling rationale for 
declaring segregation unconstitutional, like that provided in Profes-
sor Black's defense of the desegregation decision, expressed the his-
torical and contemporary reality of the race relations problem in the 
United States. The morally responsible and constitutionally sound 
way to eliminate segregation, it was widely believed, was to invoke 
the Civil War amendments and the framers' original intent to abol-
ish legal distinctions based on race. What was the fourteenth 
amendment for, if not to proscribe the kind of blatant official dis-
crimination embodied by Jim Crow? Others argued, however, that 
from the standpoint of constitutional law the best way to break 
down segregation in the South was to use the federal commerce 
power. Employed by Congress and approved by the Supreme Court 
as an all-purpose regulatory instrument since the New Deal, the 
commerce power obviated the problem of legal and historical dis-
continuity presented by the attempt to overthrow segregation. 
In the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Congress referred to both the 
commerce power and the fourteenth amendment in prohibiting ra-
cial discrimination in places of public accommodation, where one 
could see the most visible and humiliating aspect of the equal rights 
problem. In upholding the legislation in Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
Inc. v. United States,, however, the Supreme Court relied on only 
the commerce power. The Civil War amendments and their origi-
nal intent were once again passed over in a decisive Supreme Court 
ruling on civil rights. Yet at this point in the Court's deepening 
involvement in the race relations question the historical approach 
was not entirely ignored. It found candid expression in what might 
have been the landmark decision against segregation in public ac-
commodations, the Bell v. Maryland44 sit-in case, decided in June 
1964 as the civil rights bill neared passage in Congress.4s 
43. Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decision, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 430 (1960). 
44. 378 u.s. 226 (1964). 
45. Bell involved state enforcement of a criminal trespass law invoked by a restaurant 
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A study of the Supreme Court's use of history in the late 1960s 
concluded that the civil rights movement could succeed "(o]nly by 
escaping both the uncertain intentions of 1868 and the certain prac-
tices of the dark ages of post-Reconstruction .... "46 This pessi-
mistic conclusion underestimated the appeal of the original intent 
idea and the historical ingenuity of reform-minded judges and legal 
activists. Historians in this period, sympathetic with the civil rights 
movement, undertook a major revision of Reconstruction history 
that in significant degree was concerned with the intentions of the 
framers of the Civil War amendments. Revisionist history went far 
toward establishing lines of moral and political continuity between 
the purposes of the amendments and contemporary civil rights 
policy. 
In general outline similar to the law-office history resulting 
from civil rights litigation, revisionist accounts were more temper-
ate in their conclusions about the scope and intent of the Civil War 
amendments. Rejecting the early twentieth century view of Recon-
struction as the work of cynical and aggrandizing politicians, revi-
sionist historians interpreted civil rights measures as an expression 
of genuine idealism. Concentrating more on immediate political 
conditions, they paid less attention to abolitionist constitutional the-
ory. Moreover, although they acknowledged the long-range egalita-
rian aspirations that might be considered implicit in the fourteenth 
amendment, revisionist scholars placed greater emphasis on the 
framers' more narrow purpose of substantiating the Civil Rights 
Act. The new Reconstruction history also took a more sober view 
owner against black sit-in protesters. The question was whether private discrimination by the 
restaurant owner was legal, or whether the Negroes had a constitutional right to nondiscrimi-
natory service. The case thus offered the Court an opportunity to settle one of the central 
issues in the controversy over civil rights: the scope of state action under the fourteenth 
amendment in relation to the individual right of association, or the nature and extent of 
private discrimination. In an anticlimactic decision the Court remanded the case to the state 
court for reconsideration in light of a recently adopted state public accommodations law. 
Several Justices, however, took up the original intent question in concurring opinions. Justice 
Douglas, joined by Justice Goldberg, said the basic issue was the right of equal access to 
public accommodations, a right inherent in the historic purpose of the Civil War amendments 
and an attribute of national citizenship. Justice Goldberg, in a concurring opinion joined by 
Justice Douglas and Chief Justice Warren, offered a more detailed and systematic original 
intent argument. Goldberg held that the framers of the fourteenth amendment intended the 
right to be treated equally in places of public accommodation to be a right of United States 
citizenship. Summarizing congressional debates and contemporary judicial opinions, he con-
tended that the concept of civil rights was understood at the time as including a right of equal 
access, insofar as hotels, inns, theaters and the like had traditionally been regulated by state 
governments. Although it was subject to criticism on historical grounds, Goldberg's opinion 
reflected the desire of many civil rights advocates to base national policy in race relations on 
the intent of the Civil War amendments. C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES 
OF HISTORY 100-18 (1969); Kelly, supra note 35, at 146-49. 
46. C. MILLER, supra note 45, at 118. 
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of the changes in the federal system resulting from the Civil War 
amendments than did more activist scholars like Graham and ten 
Broek. There was a significant difference, revisionists believed, be-
tween the federal authority conferred by the original version of the 
fourteenth amendment, giving Congress power to make laws pro-
tecting civil rights, and the power conferred by the amendment as 
adopted, declaring that no state shall deprive persons of their civil 
rights. Nationalization of civil rights was intended, but this did not 
mean consolidation of power in Congress to legislate directly and 
plenarily against private discrimination. The intent of congres-
sional legislation was to correct state action, not to supersede or 
displace it. The new view of Reconstruction established continuity 
between original intent and modern equal rights policy, mainly by 
arguing that when legal, civil, and political rights were concerned-
that is, in matters exclusive of social distinctions that depended on 
personal preference or taste-no racial distinction or classification 
should enter into state action or public policy. Given the broad 
modern understanding of civil rights, this interpretation provided a 
historical foundation for contemporary civil rights policy.47 
Long obscured if not entirely ignored, the thirteenth amend-
ment began to supersede the fourteenth amendment as the principal 
focus of original intent thinking with regard to race relations and as 
a potential instrument of civil rights protection. The Supreme 
Court's decision in Jones v. Alfred H Mayer Co. (1968) elevated the 
thirteenth amendment to a position of theoretical preeminence in 
national civil rights policy. The case involved the claim of a black 
couple that a real estate developer's refusal to sell them a house was 
a violation of rights guaranteed by the Civil Rights Act of 1866. At 
issue was whether the Civil Rights Act not only secured the legal 
capacity to own property, but also secured a right to buy from the 
seller in question. This was a question of statutory original intent. 
Did Congress intend to prohibit private discrimination as well as 
state action denying civil rights in the Civil Rights Act? Constitu-
tional law and history had answered this question negatively. Sec-
tion 1 of the act said that all citizens had the same right to purchase 
and lease property "as is enjoyed by white citizens." Section 2 said 
47. Cf W. BROCK, AN AMERICAN CRISIS: CONGRESS AND RECONSTRUCTION 1865-
1867 (1963); L. COX & J. Cox, POLITICS, PRINCIPLE AND PREJUDICE, 1865-1877 (1965); H. 
HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUC-
TION ON THE CONSTITUTION (1973); M. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CON· 
GRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1869 (1974); E. McKITRICK, 
ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION (1960); P. PALUDAN, A COVENANT WITH 
DEATH: THE CONSTITUTION, LAW AND EQUALITY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA (1975); THE 
RADICAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION 1861-1870 (H. Hyman ed. 1967). 
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that any person who under color of any law, statute, ordinance, reg-
ulation, or custom deprived any inhabitant of rights secured by the 
act was guilty of a misdemeanor, and subject upon conviction to a 
fine of $1000 and/or one year imprisonment. This previously had 
meant that the statute was. concerned with state action, not with 
private discrimination; the court of appeals in Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer adhered to this reading of the statute. 
The Supreme Court, however, offered a new interpretation. It 
treated section 1 as guaranteeing a right to purchase property 
against infringement from any source, public or private, meaning it 
did not simply confer the legal capacity to buy property. The Court 
interpreted Section 2, meanwhile, to restrict the penalties for civil 
rights violations to state officials or persons acting in accordance 
with state law and policy. In this reading of the Civil Rights Act, 
although all persons were prohibited from denying the enumerated 
rights, only state officers were singled out for criminal penalties if 
they violated someone's rights. Presumably there would be some 
other form of legal process and enforcement to protect persons 
against private discrimination. The Court did not explain what this 
enforcement process was, or why Congress did not provide a civil 
action for purely private discrimination. Nor did the Court explain 
why, if the Civil Rights Act was understood as having such a 
sweeping effect, the fact went unremarked by opponents of the mea-
sure who otherwise were captious in their criticism of legislation 
that went beyond restricting state action. 4 8 
The Court's novel reading of the Civil Rights Act was the pre-
lude to an even more novel constitutional construction. Disregard-
ing or discounting the fact that section 1 of the fourteenth 
amendment was designed to supply the constitutional authority 
thought wanting in the thirteenth amendment with respect to civil 
rights legislation, the Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
(section 1982) was a valid exercise of congressional power under the 
thirteenth amendment. The legislative history of the antislavery 
amendment and its early judicial interpretation formed the princi-
pal evidence supporting the Court's argument. Justice Stewart, au-
thor of the majority opinion, cited the Civil Rights Cases for the 
proposition that the thirteenth amendment "abolished slavery, ... 
established universal freedom," and conferred on Congress "power 
to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and 
incidents of slavery in the United States." The foundation of the 
Court's decision, however, was the original intent of the framers of 
the thirteenth amendment. Justice Stewart observed approvingly 
48. I C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, at 1247 (1971). 
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that critics of the amendment opposed it on the ground that it 
would give Congress "virtually unlimited power to enact laws for 
the protection of Negroes in every State." He then said that "the 
majority leaders in Congress . . . had no doubt that its Enabling 
Clause contemplated the sort of positive legislation that was embod-
ied in the 1866 Civil Rights Act." Citing a speech by Senator 
Trumbull containing generalities about the power of Congress to 
"destroy all . . . discriminations in civil rights against the black 
man," Justice Stewart concluded that "[s]urely Senator Trumbull 
was right. Surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth 
Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and inci-
dents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination 
into effective legislation . . . . "49 
The trouble with the Court's opinion, as a description of his-
torical original intent, is that in 1866 Congress was not at all sure 
that under the thirteenth amendment it had the power that Justice 
Stewart said it did. Republican leaders had doubts about the nature 
and scope of legislative authority under section 2 of the amendment. 
That was the main reason for section 1 of the fourteenth amend-
ment, as the standard accounts of Reconstruction had long ago rec-
ognized. The Jones Court, however, on questionable historical 
grounds, rejected the traditional view of the purpose, intent, and 
relationships among the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, 
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 
For decades before Jones, in accordance with what had always 
seemed the intent of the framers, the fourteenth and fifteenth 
amendments had been the principal constitutional reliance of the 
civil rights movement. In the context of electoral politics and other 
forms of political action, civil rights advances had gradually been 
achieved on this basis starting in the 1930s. In the early 1960s argu-
ments began to be made that Congress, under color of the thirteenth 
amendment, could eradicate segregation and discrimination as 
badges and incidents of slavery. This strategy gained no apprecia-
ble support because it contradicted both the common-sense belief 
that slavery no longer existed in the United States, and the corre-
spondingly narrow view of the thirteenth amendment that had been 
written into constitutional law.so By the late 1960s, however, the 
argument from slavery was more persuasive. Indeed, the history of 
slavery and discrimination was relevant as never before. In some 
general sense, the decision to abolish slavery was thought by some 
49. 392 u.s. 409 (1968). 
50. Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
12 Hous. L. REV. 113 (1976). 
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civil rights leaders to imply an intention to confer comprehensive 
civil rights on blacks as a class. Discrimination that was not illegal 
at the time it existed was in effect to be declared retrospectively 
unlawful.si 
The Supreme Court had caught up with the nee-abolitionist 
vision; its decision in tum prompted further rewriting of the origi-
nal intent story in accordance with the new direction of civil rights 
policy. Law-office history thus maintained its relevance. Civil 
rights lawyer Arthur Kinoy wrote that history proved that the main 
purpose of the Civil War amendments was to make blacks equal 
participants in the American political community. Kinoy stressed 
that the thirteenth amendment did not confer "ordinary civil 
rights," but rather a special nationally-created right, separate, dis-
tinct and exclusively national in nature; this right was directly en-
forceable by the federal government. In the 1960s as in the 1860s, 
Kinoy reasoned, the fundamental issue was "the nature of slavery 
as an institution and its continued influence on the development of 
American political, economic, and legal relations.s2 Lawyer-histo-
rian Robert J. Kaczorowski asserted that the intent of the thirteenth 
and fourteenth amendments was to give Congress unlimited na-
tional authority over civil rights. "If Congress chose," Kaczorow-
ski contended, "it could legislate criminal and civil codes that 
displaced those of the states." Indeed on Kaczorowski's reading of 
original intent Congress could even destroy the states as separate 
and autonomous political entities. This version of history not only 
51. In Bell, for example, the federal government argued in an amicus curiae brief that 
the state action involved in recognizing and protecting slavery carried over into the post-
emancipation period, making the southern states legally responsible for private discrimina-
tion. In other words, state action did not end with the abolition of slavery, or even with the 
abandonment of legal segregation and discrimination. State action was historical in nature 
and had a continuous existence in the nominally private actions of individuals. Affirmative 
action rested on similar logic and offered a new way of dealing with the problem of historical 
discontinuity that confronted civil rights reformers and the Supreme Court in the early 1950s. 
No longer was history to be relegated to the category of the inconclusive, as in Brown. As the 
Supreme Court invoked thirteenth amendment original intent in Jones, so affirmative action 
policymakers justified racially preferential treatment by reference to the uninterrupted pat-
tern of slavery and discrimination that formed the central theme in American history. 
Civil rights strategy based on the thirteenth amendment conformed in essentials to the 
original intent theory advanced in the pioneering studies of the antislavery origins of the War 
amendments. It was not the thirteenth amendment or the Civil Rights Act whose "hour had 
come round at last," as the title of a law review article on Jones put it. but rather the legal-
historical activists Howard Jay Graham and Jacobus ten Broek. See Kaczorowski, Revolu-
tionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
863-940 ( 1986). 
52. Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RuTGERS L. REv. 387, 410 
(1967). See also Kinoy, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.: An Historic Step Forward, 22 V AND. L. 
REv. 475 (1969); Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom Revisited: Some First 
Thoughts on Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company, 22 RuTGERS L. REV. 537 (1968). 
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disposed of the state-action problem that had frustrated generations 
of civil rights reformers, but it also eliminated the division of sover-
eignty between federal and state governments that was thought to 
be essential to American constitutionalism.53 
Legal-historical activist G. Sidney Buchanan refined the egali-
tarian-nationalist theory of original intent, arguing that the thir-
teenth amendment was designed as a comprehensive source of 
national enforcement authority against racial or any other kind of 
discrimination regardless of its source. Unfortunately, Buchanan 
said, instead of using its thirteenth amendment power to define and 
prohibit the badges and incidents of slavery, Congress made the 
mistake of trying to protect civil rights by other means: it passed 
the Civil Rights Act and proposed the fourteenth amendment. Pre-
occupied with the bugbear of state action, these measures pushed 
the thirteenth amendment out of the civil rights picture. There fol-
lowed a long period of civil rights deprivation, caused mainly by 
judicial misunderstanding of the true nature and purpose of the 
thirteenth amendment that compounded the strategic mistake of 
Congress in the fourteenth amendment. Only with its decision in 
Jones, Buchanan wrote, did the Supreme Court recapture "the vi-
sion of the amendment's original supporters" and return it to the 
mainstream of the civil rights movement-54 
IV 
The dialectical relationship between courts and historico-legal 
activists has persisted in the period of affirmative action. Employ-
ing Kinoy's theory of a right to Negro freedom, constitutional law-
yer Robert Sedler argues that preferential policies for blacks as a 
class are a legitimate means of rectifying past discrimination and 
promoting equal participation for blacks. Sedler adds a new wrin-
kle to the original intent argument by appealing to the "historic 
context" of the Civil War amendments, rather than to the intent of 
the framers. This has the advantage, Sedler explains, of identifying 
fundamental principles and ideas in the amendments, without hav-
ing to prove that they were held by specific framers and ratifiers. 
The historic context thus "transcends" the views of the authors of 
53. R. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL 
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CiVIL RIGHTS 1866-1876 (1985). This book is 
based on the author's dissertation, "The Nationalization of Civil Rights: Constitutional The-
ory and Practice in a Racist Society, 1866-1883," (1971) (completed at the Univ. of Minne-
sota). See also Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship. and Civil 
Rights After the Civil War, 92 AM. HIST. REV. 45 (1987). 
54. Buchanan, supra note 50, at 136. 
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the constitutional text.55 Carrying on the tradition of legal-histori-
cal advocacy, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund attorney 
Eric Schnapper defends preferential treatment because it is consis-
tent with the apparently color-blind intent of the framers of the 
fourteenth amendment. Restating a Legal Defense Fund brief in 
the Bakke case, Schnapper observes that the Congress that pro-
posed the fourteenth amendment also enacted the Freedmen's Bu-
reau bill and other measures for the relief and benefit of Negroes. 
The conclusion follows, he asserts, that Congress "cannot have in-
tended the amendment to forbid the adoption of such remedies by 
itself or the states." History is thus said to justify race-conscious 
programs designed to enable blacks to improve their conditions, 
without any requirement that beneficiaries of such programs prove 
that they were actual victims of discrimination.56 
Legal-historical activists writing on the War amendments in 
the period since Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer may be described then as 
the back-to-basics, thirteenth-amendment approach to original in-
tent and civil rights enforcement.57 That it has influenced general 
55. R. Sedler, The Constitution, Racial Preference, and the Equal Participation Objec-
tive 25, 3 7 A n. 91 (June 1985) (unpublished manuscript for American Enterprise Institute 
Symposium on Slavery and the Constitution). 
56. Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 785 (1985). Justice Marshall included some historical material on 
original intent in his opinion in the Bakke case, declaring: "It is plain that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was not intended to prohibit measures designed to remedy the effects of the 
Nation's past treatment of Negroes." Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 396-97 ( 1978). 
57. The appeal of original intent thinking in relation to the Civil War amendments is 
illustrated in recent scholarship on a constitutional problem that, although peripheral to our 
main concern, warrants brief attention. The problem is the relationship of the fourteenth 
amendment to the Bill of Rights. In 1947 Justice Black touched off a major historical-legal 
controversy when he asserted that the fourteenth amendment was intended to incorporate 
and apply the Bill of Rights against the states. Howard Jay Graham wrote that the argument 
over full versus selective incorporation "seems to be largely an academic matter when histori-
cally considered." See H. GRAHAM, supra note 15, at 314. Such is the attraction of thir-
teenth amendment original intent in the period since Jones, however, that it has been used to 
resolve the incorporation question. Thus, lawyer-historian Michael Kent Curtis, seeking to 
prove that the authors of the fourteenth amendment intended to incorporate the Bill of 
Rights in the measure, introduces evidence of abolitionist and wartime Republican concern 
for universal freedom that formed the basis of the Graham-ten Broek thesis four decades ago. 
Curtis argues that the thirteenth amendment was intended to transform American constitu-
tional law by removing the institution that had subverted the guarantees of the Constitution. 
Declaratory in nature, the amendment enabled the rights, privileges, and immunities of 
American citizens-including all the rights enumerated in amendments one through eight-
to become operative restrictions on the states as well as the federal government. 
More interesting perhaps than Curtis's conclusion is his legal-historical approach to as-
saying original intent. Refusing to concede original intent analysis to those who he says 
would curtail civil rights, he proposes to find in the origins of the thirteenth amendment a 
tradition against which to measure anti-libertarian policies. Moreover, Curtis believes that 
while the language of the constitutional test is a guide to the purpose of its authors, the 
"meaning of an amendment should be sought in the abuses that produced it and in the pol it-
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historical interpretation can be seen in Equal Justice Under Law, 
the 1982 volume by Harold M. Hyman and William M. Wiecek. 
The authors state that because the original scope and intent of the 
fourteenth amendment remains unresolved, the thirteenth amend-
ment should be consulted. Hyman and Wiecek suggest that the 
views of the framers of the abolition amendment in 1865 will illumi-
nate what the framers and ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment 
"perceived and intended in 1866-68. "ss The framers of 1865 used 
the abolitionist "vocabulary of freedom" to provide for "positive 
enforcement" of "protection . . . from involuntary servitude and 
violence, and of all the full and equal rights of freedom, some of 
which history had identified and a multitude which remained for 
the inscrutable future to reveal."s9 The authors state that the thir-
teenth amendment provided a "mobile constitutional platform suit-
able for continuing ascent," and "required further national 
interventions in opposition to state or private acts that substantively 
lessened an individual's protections."60 Hyman and Wiecek con-
clude that although the framers of the fourteenth amendment were 
distracted by the state-action question raised by the black codes, 
they wisely made it "a longhand restatement . . . of the thirteenth 
amendment. "61 
Lest the impression be received that only reform-minded law-
yer-scholars have searched for the original intent of the Civil War 
amendments, the contributions of Raoul Berger should be noted. 
More than any other legal scholar of his time, Berger has insisted 
that constitutional decisions should be made in accordance with the 
original intent of the framers. A staunch defender of the legitimacy 
of judicial review, he is an equally passionate critic of what has been 
called noninterpretive review, namely, judicial decisions based not 
on the text and intent of the framers but on ideals of justice and 
conceptions of fundamental values external to the Constitution.62 
Accordingly, Berger has approached the Civil War amendments 
from the standpoint of a critic of judicial decisions that he believes 
contradict the intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment; 
ical and legal philosophy of those who proposed it." M. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL 
ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 2-12 (1986). 
58. H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL JusTicE UNDER LAW: CoNSTITUTIONAL DE· 
VELOPMENT 1835-1875, at 387 (1982). 
59. /d. at 390. 
60. !d. at 403. 
61. !d. at 406. 
62. Berger's defense of judicial review is presented in R. BERGER, CoNGRESS v. THE 
SuPREME CouRT (1969). For his criticism of noninterpretive review, see R. BERGER, Gov. 
ERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
(1977) (hereinafter R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT]. 
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among them are school desegregation, reapportionment, and voting 
rights cases in particular. Just as much the "law-office" historian as 
those whom he criticizes, Berger wants to refute the neo-abolitionist 
view that the framers built into the amendment an open-ended, rad-
ical egalitarian vision. Thus he is concerned mainly to show what 
Congress did not intend: no federal interference with state control 
over suffrage, legislative apportionment, and school segregation. 
Instead, the fourteenth amendment was intended to affirm the Civil 
Rights Act and protect the fundamental rights of the freedmen, 
which Berger says were narrowly defined as the rights of person, 
property, and equal protection of the law. Relentlessly and unapol-
ogetically polemical,63 Berger's contention that the pervasive racism 
of American society in the 1860s ruled out any open-ended egalita-
rian intent has been especially provocative.64 
Berger's writings have stimulated increased scholarly attention 
to the original intent question both as a matter of constitutional 
jurisprudence and with reference to the history of the Civil War 
amendments.6s The Supreme Court has been more reticent. 
Although affirmative action in a political and social sense rests im-
plicitly on a slavery /thirteenth amendment rationale, the leading 
judicial decisions in this area generally have avoided the constitu-
tional dimensions of the problem. 66 Yet the Court has noted the 
relevance of the fourteenth amendment to affirmative action reme-
dial programs, and at some point the Justices will probably feel 
compelled to address the question in light of the requirements, pur-
pose, and intent of the Civil War amendments.67 If history is any 
guide, it seems reasonable to predict the continued relevance of 
original intent thinking in this area of our constitutional law. 
63. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 62, at 9. 
64. See Symposium-Historical Race Relations, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 407, 415-16 (1986), 
for criticism of Berger's alleged misuse of revisionist history, static constitutionalism and 
historicism, and racial reductionism. The symposium presents evidence of civil rights pro-
gress for Negroes in the antebellum North, which is offered as a key to understanding the 
intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment to provide full racial equality. The mate-
rial on the antebellum North shows a narrow conception of civil rights consistent with Ber-
ger's view of the scope and intent of the Civil Rights Act and the fourteenth amendment. 
The difference between Berger and his critics lies in their differing view of the nature of the 
Constitution and how it changes. 
65. See, e.g., M. CURTIS, supra note 57, and Symposium. supra note 64. See also Soifer, 
Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 (1979). 
66. In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), the Supreme Court 
decided that layoffs of white teachers under a collective bargaining agreement violated the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The opinion says nothing, however. 
about the nature, purpose, meaning or intent of the fourteenth amendment. 
67. See Local Number 93, International Association of Firefighters v. City of Cleve-
land, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986). 
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Several conclusions may be drawn from this survey of histor-
ico-legal and judicial investigation of the origins and intent of the 
Civil War amendments. First, it is clear that original intent has 
been a persistent theme in the interpretation and application of the 
amendments. For students of history this may not be surprising, 
but it is worth underscoring the fact in view of recent debate about 
the wisdom of seeking original intent and the feasibility of its recov-
ery. If the history of the Civil War amendments is any indication, 
original intent is integral to constitutional adjudication. It appears, 
moreover, that it is not the exclusive concern of any political or 
ideological group. 
If original intent is regarded as a valid approach to constitu-
tional interpretation, as it now appears to be, it seems less useful to 
ask whether it ought to be considered than to ask how the Court 
can most accurately and objectively ascertain it. That it can be as-
certained would seem to admit of little doubt if history, as a method 
of knowing, a discipline, and a profession, is to be accepted as hav-
ing a legitimate place in scientific investigation. Historians con-
stantly search to determine the purpose, intent, and motivation of 
the action and events they describe. The essential questions are: 
What evidence can properly be considered as establishing the intent 
of constitution makers, and how much weight should be given to it? 
What makes the determination of constitutional original intent 
"very delicate and difficult," in Charles Fairman's words, is the fact 
that it frequently has a direct bearing on contemporary questions in 
government and politics.6s Perhaps this is why, apart from the 
standards of historical scholarship, which are honored mostly in the 
breach, there is no accepted canon to guide the search for original 
intent. As we have seen, a wide range of materials has been consid-
ered pertinent to ascertaining the intent of the Civil War amend-
ments: the constitutional text; speeches and writings of the framers 
and ratifiers; writings and commentary of like-minded reformers 
more than three decades before the adoption of the amendments; 
ideas and events that formed the historical context in which the 
amendments were framed; and even the speeches of opponents of 
the amendments. Although courts in the twentieth century have 
evolved certain criteria for establishing original intent as a question 
of constitutional law, historians and historico-legal practitioners en-
gaged in the search for the framers' purposes have not restricted 
68. C. MILLER, supra note 45, at 156-59; Fairman, Foreword: The Attack on the Segre-
gation Cases, 70 HARV. L. REv. 83, 87 (1956). 
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themselves to any particular method of inquiry or analysis.69 
If a wide net has been cast in the search for original intent, this 
does not mean that all arguments are equally valid or that no firm 
conclusions can be drawn. A generation ago the specific issue 
raised by the civil rights movement was whether the fourteenth 
amendment was intended to prohibit school segregation, and by im-
plication, segregation in society at large. Law-office history pursued 
for the sake of litigation answered this question in the negative. The 
larger conclusion that emerged from professional historical research 
in the 1950s and 1960s, however, was that the civil rights constitu-
tional amendments and statutes were intended to establish legal, 
civil, and political equality for all persons without distinction of 
color. A second conclusion was that these measures tended toward 
definition and limitation rather than inclusiveness and comprehen-
siveness. There was always room for argument about the precise 
scope of civil rights while the sphere of social rights discrimination 
based on personal preference was lawful. There was general agree-
ment, however, that the framers of the Civil War amendments were 
trying to eliminate race and color as criteria for conferring rights. 10 
Since about 1970, a year that marks the beginning of a period 
of affirmative action, the focus of original intent inquiry has shifted 
from the fourteenth amendment to the thirteenth amendment. This 
amendment, in tum, has been interpreted broadly as a source of 
power to define the badges and incidents of slavery and thus to con-
fer universal freedom on blacks. Although this power has not been 
employed in congressional legislation or elaborated in Supreme 
Court decisions dealing with the issue, affirmative action really rests 
on a thirteenth amendment rationale. Operating on a theoretically 
permissive but realistically obligatory basis, through judicial and 
administrative decrees under statutory rather than constitutional 
law, it establishes racial preferences for the victims of slavery and 
general societal discrimination. Affirmative action is peculiarly his-
torical insofar as it attributes differences between racial groups to 
slavery and discrimination, in the absence of which blacks would 
presumably be represented in the occupations and institutions of 
society in proportion to their percentage of the population. 
69. They have generally used the modern subjective approach to intent, rather than the 
statutory approach which stresses the meaning of the language of the text in relation to the 
problem it was meant to deal with, or the underlying intent of the document or text apart 
from any subjective views of its authors or any legislative history surrounding its formulation 
and adoption. See Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
885 (1985). 
70. "All men must be accorded the rights of men. Race and color are ignoble standards 
by which to judge human character and worth." Graham, supra note 18, at 661. 
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Leaving moral and philosophical comment to others, we may 
consider the validity of the thirteenth-amendment original intent ar-
gument that has emerged since Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer as a histor-
ical justification of affirmative action. Temporal sequence may not 
necessarily be related to logical sequence, 11 but it is neither logical 
nor chronological to argue that uncertainty about the fourteenth 
amendment can be resolved by turning to the thirteenth amend-
ment. The authors of this amendment did not know that another 
one would be required a year later, nor did they project a three-part 
plan for nationalizing civil rights.72 It is anachronistic to sift 
through their speeches for evidence of fourteenth amendment in-
tent. Similarly, if the language of the fourteenth amendment is am-
biguous, it is not reasonable to say that its meaning can be 
determined by invoking the language of the thirteenth amendment, 
an amendment that simply prohibits slavery and says nothing spe-
cifically about rights and liberties. One might argue that the fram-
ers of the thirteenth amendment further defined and clarified their 
purposes in passing the Civil Rights Act and proposing the four-
teenth amendment, but to reverse the sequence and argue that four-
teenth amendment intent is illuminated by debates on the thirteenth 
amendment is unhistorical. 
The purpose of the thirteenth amendment was to prohibit slav-
ery and establish an imprecisely defined but limited civil liberty cen-
tering on protection of person and property. More than the 
prescription for potentially expansive civil rights, the framers hoped 
to eliminate a well-known, clearly defined, and despised institution, 
namely, chattel slavery. That no centralizing and egalitarian pur-
pose was intended can be seen in the rejection in 1864 of Charles 
Sumner's proposal for abolishing slavery by constitutional amend-
ment: "All persons are equal before the law, so that no person can 
hold another as a slave; and the Congress shall have power to make 
all laws necessary and proper to carry this declaration into effect 
everywhere within the United States and the jurisdiction thereof."73 
The framers preferred the historical model of the Northwest Ordi-
nance to that of French egalitarianism. The Ordinance had a well 
understood and circumscribed legal meaning, and had been inter-
preted to prohibit only the master-slave relationship, not to confer 
civil or political rights on Negroes. As Republicans contemplated 
the end of the war in 1865, their aim was to control and shape the 
political situation, including possible peace talks, by placing the 
71. Cf R. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 110 (1946). 
72. Cf TEN BROEK, supra note 23, at 158. 
73. See H. BELZ, supra note 34, at 126. 
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Emancipation Proclamation and other antislavery measures on a le-
gally unimpeachable basis. Examined in its immediate historical 
context, therefore, the purposes of the thirteenth amendment were a 
good deal more limited and politically expedient than broadly egali-
tarian and visionary. That Republican congressmen said it would 
secure "equal, universal and impartial liberty" does not gainsay this 
fact. 74 The thirteenth amendment was not intended as a compre-
hensive grant of civil rights, nor as a revolution in federalism au-
thorizing direct and plenary legislation over civil rights. 75 
Like civil rights policy in general, the search for original intent 
since Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer has exhibited tendencies toward 
what might be called historicist fundamentalism. If the purposes of 
the fourteenth amendment are unsatisfyingly ambiguous and the 
limitations of state action in constitutional law cannot easily be ex-
punged, then the simpler requirement and authority of the thir-
teenth amendment may provide a more useful recourse. If the 
securing of individual civil rights under the concept of equal oppor-
tunity does not produce the desired social results, then policies 
aimed at proportional equity for the victims of slavery and historic 
social discrimination may bring about significant change. If the ra-
cially impartial fourteenth amendment does not lend itself to the 
needs of present social policy, then the more fundamental thirteenth 
amendment, in historical context regarded as a race-conscious char-
ter of freedom, may supply the rationale for compensatory and re-
distributive social policies. 
If, as seems likely, the legitimacy of affirmative action will be 
resolved at some point with reference to the Constitution, it is 
worth asking what conception of equality guided the framers of the 
Civil War amendments. Although as a practical matter post-eman-
cipation policy was directed principally toward the freed slaves, the 
statutes and amendments that defined civil rights and extended the 
sphere of freedom were racially impartial. American slavery had 
been racial slavery; American freedom accordingly had been ra-
cially qualified in historical and political reality. The Civil War 
amendments were intended to remove this racial qualification as a 
condition of republican civil liberty. In the historical circum-
stances, any measure to establish legal or civil equality, whether or 
not formulated in racial terms, could be looked on as preferential 
toward blacks. (President Johnson made this point in his veto 
messages on civil rights legislation.) It is true that a few minor re-
lief bills passed by Congress dealt expressly and exclusively with 
74. See M. CURTIS, supra note 57, at 54. 
75. See H. BELZ, supra note 34, at 113-34. 
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blacks. The constitutional amendments and principal statutes con-
cerned with civil rights as part of the Reconstruction settlement, 
however, contained no distinction of color. 
Segregation was eliminated in response to the demand of the 
Negro protest movement for equality without distinction of color-
a demand justified in part by historical analysis of the color blind 
original intent of the Civil War amendments. This historical inter-
pretation of original intent, concerned specifically with legal, civil, 
and political rights, 76 helped rationalize the discontinuity in consti-
tutional development signified by the overthrow of segregation. 
The challenge to the principle of racial impartiality raised in recent 
years by the need to justify affirmative action seeks to establish a 
different kind of continuity, one that is based on slavery and its so-
cial consequences as an enduring factor in American history and 
society. It posits a racially preferential intent behind the Civil War 
amendments that is used to justify social policies based not on the 
present condition of individual blacks, but simply on the different 
historical experiences of the two races in America. n Once again, 
historical debates about original intent are at the forefront. 78 
76. As Paul Finkelman has recently pointed out, despite widespread racism civil rights 
gains for blacks were achieved in many northern states before the Civil War. These changes, 
securing basic legal rights and protections, defined the content of the formal legal equality for 
all Americans guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. See Finkelman, Prelude to the Four-
teenth Amendment: Black Legal Rights in the Antebellum North, 17 RuTGERS L.J. 415,479-
80 (1986). 
77. Thurow, The Declaration of Independence and the Equal Protection of the Laws, in 
STILL THE LAW OF THE LAND? EssAYS ON CHANGING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION 116-19 (1987). 
78. It is ironic that the theory of historical victimization and the continuing presence of 
slavery should find support at the very moment when the idea of racial equality was substan-
tially accepted in public opinion, and black progress in politics, society, and civil rights was 
plainly apparent. It is perhaps more than ironic that a desire for historical justice should 
obscure and interfere with the effort to establish conditions of mutual dignity and respect in 
race relations, based on equal rights without distinction of color, which was the goal and 
intent of the framers of the Civil War amendments. Of course the framers of the 1860s were 
concerned in a practical way with the conditions and rights of the freed slaves. They were 
writing a constitution to preserve and extend the rights and liberties of all Americans, how-
ever, not just those of emancipated blacks. This view of the intent of the Civil War amend-
ments stands out most clearly in the historical record. Whether it is still a relevant and 
legitimate guide and standard is the central issue in the continuing controversy over civil 
rights in American society. 
